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This paper reviews the projections of the Economic Policy Committee and the European Commission 
on age-related expenditure carried out in 2005. It takes a closer look at the results of public pension 
expenditure projections with a view of analysing the timing of projected changes and the driving 
factors behind pension expenditure increases, as well as the sensitivity of the projections to certain 
economic and demographic assumptions. It intends to provide a more in-depth understanding on the 
evolution of projected public pension expenditure and thereby contributing to the debate on the 
assessment of the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
 
The paper serves as a quality assessment of public pension expenditure projections, which were 
carried out by the experts in each Member State. It takes a careful look at the differences in results 
across Member States. It concludes that differences in the results can qualitatively be explained by 
different pension policies and systems as well as different population and labour force projections and 
economic assumptions. However, the contribution of different factors to the results or whether the 
differences in the results are fully explicable by these factors cannot be disentangled. 
 
The analysis of the projection results suggests that the risks to the baseline projection are on the 
upside. Among the driving factors which have an impact on the public pension expenditure 
projections, the employment rate increase, the pension take-up ratio decrease and the benefit ratio 
decrease have all significant offsetting impact on the increase in pension expenditure. The offsetting 
effect is the strongest over the first two decades of the projection period. This indicates that the 
reliability of pension expenditure projections will crucially depend on whether the assumed positive 
trends in employment and pension take-up actually materialise.  
 
The analysis of sensitivity scenarios suggests that the public pension expenditure projections are 
sensitive to the assumptions on life expectancy, employment and labour productivity – and hence to 
wages. However, the sensitivity varies considerably across countries depending on the design of 
pension systems as to how responsive they are to shocks. The projections are not sensitive to higher or 
lower interest rates as the public pensions are not funded in the vast majority of Member States. 
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  -6-SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 
This paper analyses public pension expenditure projections at the EU15 and EU10 level 
with a particular focus on the timing of, and driving factors behind, the projected 
changes in public pension expenditure as well as the sensitivity of the projections to 
certain economic and demographic assumptions. 
The full range of public pension schemes was covered in the projection exercise. This 
provided a reliable basis for public pension expenditure projections. The projections for 
each different Member State were made by experts in that State, enabling the country-
specific features of pension systems to be properly taken into account. Differences in the 
results from one country to another can qualitatively be explained by different pension 
policies and pension systems as well as different population and labour force projections 
and economic assumptions. However, the contribution of different factors to the results 
or whether the differences in the results are fully explicable by these factors cannot be 
disentangled. 
Overall, the analysis suggests that risks to the baseline projection are on the upside. 
Among the driving forces which have an impact on the public pension expenditure 
projections, the employment rate, the pension take-up ratio and the benefit ratio have a 
significant offsetting impact on the ageing-related projected increase in pension 
expenditure. 
This offsetting effect is projected to be strongest over the first two decades of the 
projection period, so that either no or only minor increases in public pension spending 
relative to GDP are projected in that period. Thus, the reliability of pension expenditure 
projections over the whole projection period will crucially depend on whether the 
assumed positive trends in employment and pension take-up actually materialise. They 
can therefore also be considered to be risk factors: if they do not materialise, other 
things being equal, the projected increase in pension expenditure relative to GDP will be 
higher than in the current projections. This risk is the highest at the beginning of the 
projection period and is greater in the EU10 than EU15 countries. In the EU10 Member 
States, the rate of population ageing will be fastest over the next 15 years, but pension 
expenditure is projected to very largely resist this pressure – and is also expected to do 
so when the ageing process in the EU10 countries accelerates again at the end of the 
projection period. 
One important finding is that benefit ratios are projected to fall over the whole 
projection period, both in the EU25 as a whole and in almost every country. If the 
benefit ratios would remain at their current levels, public pension expenditure in EU25 
would increase by 2.7 percentage points of GDP by 2050 (in addition to the projected 
2.2 percentage points increase). The main driving force behind falling benefit ratios 
(though the benefit ratio indicator also captures many other features) is the difference 
between the assumed wage growth rate and the growth rate of average pensions, which 
is kept in check by below-wage indexation. Only in Luxembourg and Slovenia are 
earnings-related pensions fully indexed to wage growth rates, while Denmark and the 
Netherlands have flat-rate pensions that are also indexed to wages. In the remaining 
countries, public pensions are indexed either to prices only or to hybrid indices allotting 
different weights to prices and wages. This results in falling benefit ratios in countries 
which are in transition from higher to lower indexation parameters. The analysis also 
  -7-shows that benefit ratios are falling most strongly in countries which have recently 
switched to price indexation and which also have the highest projected increases in 
labour productivity – and hence in wages.  
While benefit ratios are projected to fall, the analysis also shows that all countries 
project increases in real average pensions over the same period. This demonstrates that 
pension policies aim at ensuring and partially increasing the purchasing power of 
pensioners but not fully compensating to pensioners the increase in living standards of 
wage earners. When looking at the projected evolution of average pensions in the light of 
indexation rules, it appeared that pension indexation rules alone did not prove sufficient 
to explain the projected real increases in average pensions, which can also be quite 
significantly affected by other factors such as reforms, discretionary decisions and 
changes in the structure of pensions or pensioners.  
The fall in the benefit ratio captures two types of calculation assumptions: an 
assumption regarding the labour productivity growth rate, which was used in calculating 
the evolution of wages, while the evolution of average pensions is determined by the 
indexation policies and pension reforms. Both the assumption on wage developments and 
the rules applied to pension developments must therefore be taken into account when the 
results showing increasing expenditure and falling benefit ratios are interpreted.  If the 
assumption of the labour productivity growth rate – and hence of wage increases – is too 
optimistic, the projected increase in pension expenditure relative to GDP will 
necessarily be underestimated and the fall in the benefit ratio overestimated, giving an 
overly negative view of the adequacy of public pensions. 
In addition to the driving forces of the baseline pension projection, the analysis 
considers a number of sensitivity scenarios. These suggest that the public pension 
projections are sensitive to the assumptions on life expectancy, employment and labour 
productivity – and hence to wage developments. But, public pension expenditure is not 
sensitive to higher or lower interest rates as public pensions are not funded in the vast 
majority of countries.  
The size of the assumed shocks modelled in the sensitivity scenarios is not easily 
comparable and caution should be exercised when interpreting whether the results are 
more sensitive to one factor than another. However, one way of comparing the 
introduced shocks in the higher life expectancy and higher employment rate scenarios is 
to compare the change in the economic dependency ratio that they cause. It appears that 
the increase of the number of pensioners in higher life expectancy scenario increases the 
economic dependency ratio (inactive persons relative to the employed) by around 5% 
while the increase in the number of employed persons in higher employment rate 
scenarios (one percentage point increase in the overall employment rate or 5 percentage 
point increase in the employment rate of older workers) decreases the economic 
dependency ratio by around 1.5%. 
By and large, the projections suggest that a one-year increase in life expectancy 
increases public pension expenditure by 0.5 percentage point of GDP by 2050 in 
countries with defined-benefit or flat-rate schemes and about by half that in countries 
with defined-contribution schemes or other life expectancy adjustments. Higher labour 
productivity helps contain the pressure on public pension expenditure, while also 
allowing real average pensions to increase faster than in the baseline scenario, but at 
the same time reduces the benefit ratio.  
  -8-Sensitivity tests of higher employment rates give somewhat lower bounds for the impact 
on pension expenditure in terms of percentage of GDP in the long run. This is due to the 
fact that higher employment rates lead immediately also to higher GDP and enable 
workers to accumulate further pension rights, thus improving the adequacy of pensions. 
The impact is also dependant on the design of the pension scheme: in defined-
contribution schemes, the impact can even be an increase in pension expenditure while 
larger decreases in pension expenditure are seen in defined-benefit schemes, in 
particular if the take-up of non-actuarial early pensions can be reduced. On the average 
in the EU25, one percentage point increase in employment would decrease public 
pension spending by 0.1 percentage point of GDP.  This magnitude of sensitivity is also 
borne out by the analysis of the driving factors for the baseline projection, which shows 
that, by and large, a 10-percentage-point increase in employment would reduce the 
increase in public pension expenditure by 1-2 percentage points by 2050.  
The country graphs in the Annex shed additional light on the differences between 
countries by analysing how different driving forces matter for the public pension 
expenditure projections of individual countries. 
The analysis was carried out mainly at the EU15 and EU10 level, though it also focused 
on countries which were outliers or which showed exceptional developments over time. 
However, it turned out to be difficult to draw firm conclusions on why a country appears 
exceptional in one respect or another despite the fact that the projections of each 
Member State were discussed in a peer review and country fiches tried to explain 
county-specific features of pension systems and projections. Looking ahead at the next 
projections, it would warrant devote more effort to make the projections more 
transparent and use more time for peer reviews. In particular, improved transparency 
regarding the modelling of the impact of reforms or given assumptions, which often 
require expert judgement, would result in a better understanding of the results. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This note takes a close look at the results of pension expenditure projections. Its primary 
purpose is to analyse the timing of projected changes and the driving factors behind pension 
expenditure increases, as well as the sensitivity of the projections to various assumptions. It is 
a response to the Economic Policy Committee’s request that the results of pension 
expenditure projections be analysed in greater depth, while also contributing to the debate on 
the assessment of the long-term sustainability of public finances as a whole
1.  
The note analyses only public pension expenditure projections, which are at the core of the 
assessment of the long-term sustainability of public finances. It mainly treats the EU15 and 
EU10 en bloc, though it also focuses on countries which either are of particular relevance to 
the trend or represent a deviation from the trend.  
As the pension expenditure projections were conducted by the experts of Member States, the 
data provided to the Commission services did not always include sufficient information to 
explain the country-specific features in the projections. Therefore, the members of the Ageing 
Working Group were invited to provide further explanations and analysis on the results of 
their countries. This note benefits heavily from these explanations and additional analyses. 
The note is structured as follows: Section 2 takes an overall look at the public pension 
expenditure projections and the timing of the projected changes. Section 3 analyses the effect 
of driving factors on the changes in projected pensions and their timing by splitting the 
projection period up into shorter time periods with the aim of disentangling the relative 
influence of the driving factors over time. Section 4 looks at the sensitivity of the projections 
to various assumptions used in the projection exercise. The Annex shows the timing of the 
effect of driving factors by country and the decomposition of the pension take-up ratio by age 
group in each country. 
 
2.  PUBLIC PENSION EXPENDITURE 
2.1.  Results of the baseline projection of public pension expenditure 
Gross public pension expenditure 
Table 2-1 presents the projections for public pension spending before taxes and social security 
contributions paid out to the beneficiaries, as a percentage of GDP
2. In this baseline 
                                                 
1   This paper primarily complements the analysis of the age-related expenditure projections presented in the 
following publication: The Economic Policy Committee and  the European Commission (2006), "The 
impact of ageing on public expenditure: projections for the EU-25 Member States on pensions, health care, 
long-term care, education and unemployment transfers (2004-2050)", European Economy, Special Reports 
No 1/2006. 
2   Gross social security and other public pensions correspond conceptually to the coverage of the 2001 projections of 
public pension expenditure 
  -10-projection no policy change is assumed; in other words, pensions are projected to evolve in 
accordance with the current pension legislation, including the reforms legislated before the 
mid of 2005. At the starting point in 2004, public pension spending accounted for an average 
of about 10.6% of GDP in the EU Member States, though with a wide variation from the 
lowest – 4.7% in Ireland – to the highest – 14.2% in Italy. The low levels of public spending 
on pensions in Ireland and the United Kingdom stem from the fact that the public pension 
schemes primarily provide flat-rate pensions, with occupational pensions playing an important 
role in total pension provision. In contrast, the high level of public spending in terms of GDP 
percentages in countries such as France, Austria, Poland and Italy reflects the fact that 
pension provision relies mainly on social security schemes and that the principal scheme is 
earnings-related. 
Public pension spending is clearly below the EU average in a number of EU10 Member States 
such as Cyprus and Malta as well as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia. In the latter 
group of countries, this can be attributed partially to the fact that the current pensions are 
relatively flat-rate as most of pensioners acquired their pension rights before the collapse of 
the communist regime in societies which had relatively small wage differences, and in some 
cases to the fact that the levels of pensions are based only on length of service. It is also 
partially due to the fact that, in recent years, the economy has grown rapidly, thereby reducing 
spending as a percentage of GDP from the figures seen, for example, in 2000.  
 
Table 2-1  Gross public pension expenditure as a share of GDP between 2004 and 2050  
Public pensions, gross as % of GDP  Change Change Change
Country 2004 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2004-2030 2030-2050 2004-2050
BE 10,4 10,4 11,0 12,1 13,4 14,7 15,7 15,5 4,3 0,8 5,1
CZ 8,5 8,2 8,2 8,4 8,9 9,6 12,2 14,0 1,1 4,5 5,6
DK 9,5 10,1 10,8 11,3 12,0 12,8 13,5 12,8 3,3 0,0 3,3
DE 11,4 10,5 10,5 11,0 11,6 12,3 12,8 13,1 0,9 0,8 1,7
EE 6,7 6,8 6,0 5,4 5,1 4,7 4,4 4,2 -1,9 -0,5 -2,5
GR
ES 8,6 8,9 8,8 9,3 10,4 11,8 15,2 15,7 3,3 3,9 7,1
FR 12,8 12,9 13,2 13,7 14,0 14,3 15,0 14,8 1,5 0,5 2,0
IE 4,7 5,2 5,9 6,5 7,2 7,9 9,3 11,1 3,1 3,2 6,4
IT 14,2 14,0 13,8 14,0 14,4 15,0 15,9 14,7 0,8 -0,4 0,4
CY 6,9 8,0 8,8 9,9 10,8 12,2 15,0 19,8 5,3 7,6 12,9
LV 6,8 4,9 4,6 4,9 5,3 5,6 5,9 5,6 -1,2 -0,1 -1,2
LT 6,7 6,6 6,6 7,0 7,6 7,9 8,2 8,6 1,2 0,7 1,8
LU 10,0 9,8 10,9 11,9 13,7 15,0 17,0 17,4 5,0 2,4 7,4
HU 10,4 11,1 11,6 12,5 13,0 13,5 16,0 17,1 3,1 3,7 6,7
MT 7,4 8,8 9,8 10,2 10,0 9,1 7,9 7,0 1,7 -2,1 -0,4
NL 7,7 7,6 8,3 9,0 9,7 10,7 11,7 11,2 2,9 0,6 3,5
AT 13,4 12,8 12,7 12,8 13,5 14,0 13,4 12,2 0,6 -1,7 -1,2
PL 13,9 11,3 9,8 9,7 9,5 9,2 8,6 8,0 -4,7 -1,2 -5,9
PT 11,1 11,9 12,6 14,1 15,0 16,0 18,8 20,8 4,9 4,8 9,7
SI 11,0 11,1 11,6 12,3 13,3 14,4 16,8 18,3 3,4 3,9 7,3
SK 7,2 6,7 6,6 7,0 7,3 7,7 8,2 9,0 0,5 1,3 1,8
FI 10,7 11,2 12,0 12,9 13,5 14,0 13,8 13,7 3,3 -0,3 3,1
SE 10,6 10,1 10,3 10,4 10,7 11,1 11,6 11,2 0,4 0,2 0,6
UK 6,6 6,6 6,7 6,9 7,3 7,9 8,4 8,6 1,3 0,7 2,0
EU15 
1) 10,6 10,4 10,5 10,8 11,4 12,1 12,9 12,9 1,5 0,8 2,3
EU10 10,9 9,8 9,2 9,5 9,7 9,8 10,6 11,1 -1,0 1,3 0,3
EU12 
1) 11,5 11,3 11,4 11,8 12,5 13,2 14,2 14,1 1,6 0,9 2,6
EU25 
1) 10,6 10,3 10,4 10,7 11,3 11,9 12,8 12,8 1,3 0,8 2,2
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•  The projections show very different increases in public pension spending over the 
period between 2004 and 2050, ranging from a decrease of 5.9 percentage points of 
GDP in Poland to an increase of 9.7 p.p. of GDP in Portugal and 12.9 p.p. of GDP in 
Cyprus. 
•  In the EU15 Member States, public pension spending is projected to rise by 2.3 p.p. of 
GDP on average and to rise in all countries except in Austria. In Austria, the spending 
peaks around 2035 but decreases thereafter. In Italy and Sweden, where the pension 
schemes are notional defined-contribution, the projected increases over the entire 
period 2004-2050 are very small. However, pension spending will peak in 2040 for 
Italy with an increase of about 2 percentage points and in Sweden the increase 
between 2010 and 2040 is projected to be about 1.5 percentage points of GDP.  
•  Relatively moderate increases (between 1.7 and 3.5 percentage points) in public 
pension expenditure are projected in many of the EU15 Member States such as 
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands. 
Somewhat larger increases are projected in Belgium (5.1 p.p.) and Ireland (6.4 p.p.). 
In Ireland, the increase will largely be due to the maturing of the social security 
pension system. 
•  The largest rises in pension expenditure in the EU are faced by Portugal (an increase 
of 9.7 p.p. of GDP), Luxembourg (7.4 p.p.) and Spain (7.1 p.p.). 
•  In the EU10 Member States, public pension expenditure is projected to fall by 1 p.p. 
of GDP by 2030 on average but then to rise by 1.3 p.p. by 2050, with an overall 
increase of 0.3 p.p. between 2004 and 2050. However, the developments show very 
diverse trends in different countries: from a fall of 5.9 p.p. of GDP in Poland to an 
increase of 6.7 p.p. in Hungary, 7.3 p.p. of GDP in Slovenia and 12.9 p.p. in Cyprus. If 
Poland is excluded from this group, the projected increase in public pension spending 
is 4.9 p.p. of GDP in the remaining nine new Member States. 
•  The projected decreases in Poland, Estonia and Latvia, as well as the projected small 
increases in Lithuania and Slovakia, stem partly from the pension reforms enacted 
during the last decade. These countries have switched part of the public old-age 
pension scheme into private funded schemes, so that public provision will decrease 
while the private part, which remains mandatory, will increase. Furthermore, the GDP 
growth rate is projected to be relatively high, in particular during the next two 
decades, and to be higher than the increase in the level of pensions, as pensions are 
either only indexed to prices or only partially indexed to wages.  
•  In Malta, the projected decrease in pension spending after 2020 stems from the current 
parameters of the pension scheme, notably the fact that the maximum pension is 
indexed to prices, which will lead to relatively flat-rate pensions over time and to a 
situation where virtually all pensions will develop only in line with prices. 
•  The challenges faced by Cyprus, Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic are 
among the biggest in the EU.  
 
  -12-Overall assessment of the coverage of public pension schemes 
The coverage of public pension schemes was carefully examined during the projection 
exercise. ‘Public pensions’ are here intended to include all social security pensions and 
also those public pensions which do not constitute a specific scheme but are paid directly 
from government budgets, such as public sector employees' pensions. The pensions cover 
old-age, early, disability and survivors' pensions, whether earnings-related, flat-rate or 
means-tested. Public pensions of this study are also intended to cover benefits which can 
be considered equivalent to pensions, namely social assistance when provided as a 
minimum pension and unemployment or disability benefits when provided on long-term 
basis. 
The reports by Member States show that very considerable effort has been made to 
guarantee a very broad and comparable coverage of public pensions. Only minor schemes 
have been reported as not covered by the following countries: 
•  Means-tested minimum benefits from social assistance (when equivalent to a 
minimum pension) to elderly people in Germany and Luxembourg, and means-
tested minimum pensions in Cyprus, Austria and Poland. In addition, some 
supplementary benefits paid to those on minimum or low pensions are not covered 
in the projections of Cyprus and Hungary. In general, these benefits do not exceed 
0.5% of GDP. 
•  Farmers’ and miners’ pensions (0.8% of GDP) are not covered by Germany. Small 
anticipatory pensions are not covered by France. 
•  Disability pensions are not covered by the United Kingdom. The new French 
disability scheme, established in 2004 and covered by health insurance, is not 
covered in the projections for France. 
Overall, the coverage of public pensions in the projections can be considered to be very good.  
In addition, the projections broke pensions down into strictly age-related pensions, i.e. old-age 
and early pensions, on one hand, and other pensions, i.e. disability and survivors' pensions, on 
the other. The reason for separating them on the basis of the beneficiary’s age rather than the 
name of the pension was both to improve cross-country comparability of age-related pension 
expenditure and to make coverage more transparent, as categorisation varies from one country 
to another. Some countries for instance consider disability pensions (benefits) as part of their 
sickness insurance scheme while in others they fall under the pension scheme; and in some 
countries, the pension retains the same classification from the time when it is first granted 
until payment ends, while in most countries, an early or disability pension is transformed into 
an old-age pension when the beneficiary reaches the standard old-age retirement age. 
However, it turned out that it is not so easy to bridge the gap between national practices and 
the sought-after EU-wide common definition. The quality of coverage of the two separate 
categories of public pensions, namely (i) old-age and early pensions and (ii) other pensions, is 
clearly poorer than the coverage of all public pensions taken together. In particular, Germany, 
France, Cyprus and Slovenia did not provide a breakdown of public pensions, while in Malta, 
the breakdown overestimates the role of ‘other pensions’ by categorising all specific pension 
schemes as such when, in fact, they are equivalent to old-age pension schemes.  
  -13-Therefore, total public pensions is a more reliable variable than strictly age-related pensions 
in the public pension expenditure projections. The analysis that follows is consequently based 
on total public pensions. 
 
2.2.  Timing of the overall increases in public pension expenditure   
The projected increase in public pension expenditure shows very different patterns for 
different Member States. Graph 2-1 groups the countries according to the projected increase 
in public pension expenditure.  
The first picture shows relatively similar patterns for countries with the fastest increase 
(between 6.7 and 12.9 percentage points of GDP) in public pension expenditure. In particular, 
in Portugal, Slovenia, Hungary and Luxembourg, both the starting level of pension spending 
and the pace of the increase are quite close to each other, while Cyprus and Spain start from a 
somewhat lower level and show a different rate of increase at the end of the projection period. 
The pension spending at the end of the projection period is at a high level in all these 
countries, between 16 and 21% of GDP. 
In the second group of countries (BE, DK, FI, IE, NL and CZ) the projected increase in public 
pension expenditure is between 3 and 6.4 percentage points of GDP, while the starting level 
of pension expenditure varies significantly, between 4.7 and 10.7% of GDP. In 2050, the 
diversity in pension spending is projected to be somewhat smaller, between 11 and 15% of 
GDP. 
In the third group of countries (DE, FR, UK, LT, SK and SE), the projected increase is 
relatively continuous but small, at 2 percentage points or slightly less, and in Sweden only 0.6 
p.p. However, the starting levels of pension spending vary quite significantly, between 7 and 
13% of GDP. This group is also relatively heterogeneous in terms of both how their pension 
systems are structured and the likely explanations for a projected increase in pension 
spending. 
In the fourth group of countries (PL, EE, LV, AT, MT and IT), the projected increase between 
2004 and 2050 in public pension expenditure is negative, with the exception of Italy where it 
is virtually the same at the end as at the start of the projection period (but with a clear increase 
to the peak). However, the level of pension spending itself (at both the start and the end of the 
period) in these countries is very different: three of them (IT, AT, PL) are at about 14% of 
GDP and the other three (EE, LV and MT) at about 7% of GDP. The shape of the projected 
increase also varies considerably: three countries (IT, AT and MT) project a peak in pension 
spending before the end of the projection period while the three others (PL, EE and LV) 
project a very sharp decrease at the beginning of the period. 
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2.3.  Peaks in public pension expenditure 
The pressure for increased public pension spending over the projection period may vary for 
different reasons, notably due to the timing of the retirement of the baby-boom generation. 
Many Member States see their peak in public pension spending before the end year of the 
projections, for instance BE, DK, FR, IT, NL and SE around 2040 and FI and AT already 
around 2030. On the other hand, many countries project a fall in public pension spending as a 
percentage of GDP at the beginning of the projection period, for instance DE, IT, AT and SE. 
Thus, for most countries, the projected increase in public pension spending from the trough 
year to the peak year is more than the projected increase between 2004 and 2050. Moreover, 
in many EU10 countries, public pension spending drops significantly at the beginning of the 
projection period due to the switch to private funded schemes. 
 
  -15-In the EU15, the increase between 2011, the trough year, and 2041, the peak year, is projected 
to be 2.7 percentage points of GDP, 0.4 percentage points more than the increase between 
2004 and 2050. In the EU10, the trough year will be 2014 and the increase from 2014 to 2050 
is projected to be 1.9 percentage points, as opposed to only 0.3 percentage points between 
2004 and 2050. 
 
For some countries, the projected fall at the beginning and the peak before the end of the 
projection period will create a hump-shaped trend over the projection period. This 
corresponds only partially to demographic pressures. The old-age dependency ratios will start 
increasing in all countries already from the beginning of the projection period and continue to 
increase up to end of the period (with the exceptions of Finland, which reaches the peak in the 
old-age dependency ratio in 2036, and Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands, which reach 
the peak around 2040), but the pension expenditure projections deviate from these 
demographic changes due to the impacts of pension reforms. Increasing employment rates 
will mainly affect the first part of the projection period. Consequently, pension spending 
increases by less than implied by the demographic changes in that period, and notably over 
the first five to ten years. Similarly, the projected fall in pension spending after the peak year 
can be explained by the projected fall in the benefit ratio. However, many countries project 
that the current level of public pension spending can be more or less maintained over the next 
10 – and even 20 – years. For IT, AT and SE, public pension expenditure is projected to be at 
the same level in 2024 as in 2004. 
 
The projected fall in the benefit ratio is most striking in Malta, where pension spending is 
projected to peak in 2021 and then fall. This is due to the current indexation rule of pensions, 
whereby the pension cap will be indexed to prices only, so that most pensions will approach 
the cap level, and then become flat-rate, with no increase in average real pensions.  
 
  -16-Table 2-2  Peaks and troughs in public pension expenditure as a share of GDP  
Country Start year
Trough year 
(before peak) Trough value
Decrease 














BE 10,4 2010 2038 15,7 5,3 15,5 5,1
CZ 8,5 2015 8,2 -0,3 2021 2050 14,0 5,8 14,0 5,6
DK 9,5 2038 13,5 4,0 12,8 3,3
DE 11,4 2012 10,3 -1,0 2014 2049 13,1 2,8 13,1 1,7
EE 6,7 2006 7,7 1,0 4,2 -2,5
GR
ES 8,6 2005 2045 16,2 7,6 15,7 7,1
FR 12,8 2007 2038 15,0 2,2 14,8 2,0
IE 4,7 2005 4,6 -0,1 2005 2050 11,1 6,5 11,1 6,4
IT 14,2 2012 13,8 -0,4 2023 2038 15,9 2,1 14,7 0,4
CY 6,9 2050 19,8 12,9 19,8 12,9
LV 6,8 2015 4,6 -2,2 2035 5,9 1,3 5,6 -1,2
LT 6,7 2012 6,5 -0,2 2017 2050 8,6 2,1 8,6 1,8
LU 10,0 2008 9,7 -0,3 2010 2045 17,7 8,0 17,4 7,4
HU 10,4 2050 17,1 6,7 17,1 6,7
MT 7,4 2019 10,2 2,8 7,0 -0,4
NL 7,7 2006 7,4 -0,3 2011 2038 11,7 4,3 11,2 3,5
AT 13,4 2013 12,6 -0,8 2024 2032 14,1 1,5 12,2 -1,2
PL 13,9 2004 13,9 8,0 -5,9
PT 11,1 2050 20,8 9,7 20,8 9,7
SI 11,0 2007 2050 18,3 7,3 18,3 7,3
SK 7,2 2013 6,5 -0,7 2023 2050 9,0 2,5 9,0 1,8
FI 10,7 2005 10,4 -0,3 2008 2032 14,1 3,7 13,7 3,1
SE 10,6 2008 9,9 -0,7 2024 2040 11,6 1,7 11,2 0,6
UK 6,6 2006 6,5 -0,1 2010 2050 8,6 2,1 8,6 2,0
EU15 10,6 2011 10,3 -0,3 2017 2041 13,0 2,7 12,9 2,3
EU10 10,9 2014 9,2 -1,7 2044 2050 11,1 1,9 11,1 0,3
EU12 11,5 2011 11,2 -0,3 2017 2043 14,2 3,0 14,0 2,5
EU25 10,6 2012 10,3 -0,3 2018 2040 12,8 2,5 12,8 2,2  
 
3.  DRIVING FACTORS AND THEIR IMPACT ON PROJECTED PUBLIC PENSION EXPENDITURE 
3.1.  Factors driving the change in public pension expenditure 
The factors driving the increases in pension spending can be further analysed by decomposing 
the results of the projections into four main explanatory factors, namely: 
•  A dependency effect (or a population ageing effect), which measures the changes in 
the dependency ratio over the projection period as the ratio of persons aged 65 and 
over to the population aged 15 to 64;  
•  an  employment effect, which measures changes in the share of the population of 
working age (15 to 64) relative to the number of the employed, i.e. an inverse 
employment rate; 
•  a pension take-up effect
3, which measures changes in the share of pensioners relative 
to the population aged 65 and over. In effect, it measures the take-up of pensions 
relative to the number of old people. For some countries (DE, ES, LV, LT, AT), the 
reported number of pensioners represents the number of pensions rather than the 
                                                 
3     This effect is also known as ‘eligibility effect’ in the literature.  
  -17-number of pensioners. However, this bias should not affect the evolution in the take-
up ratio over time; 
•  a benefit effect, which captures changes in the average pension relative to output per 
employed person. Average pension and output per worker, approximating the average 
wage, are measured each year of the projection exercise for the total population of 
pensioners and employees. Thus, the benefit ratio captures several features at the same 
time. First, it reflects the assumed increases in average pensions due to the indexation 
rules, the maturation of the pension system and longer contribution periods. Second, it 
reflects also the changes in average wages driven by the assumptions of labour 
productivity growth rates. Third, it also captures the changes in the structure of the 
respective population groups as these groups measure the projected groups of 
pensioners and wage earners each year of the projection exercise. In particular, it 
should be noted that the benefit ratio does not measure the level of the pension for any 
individual relative to his/her own wage and, hence, is not equivalent to a replacement 
rate indicator
4.   
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4   Table 2-2 of the Annex in the main report (European Economy, Special Report 2006:1) presents the 
gross and net replacement ratios of pensions calculated for a hypothetical individual with a full career of 
40 years on average earnings. 
  -18-Table 3-1  The contribution of the decomposed factors to the change (in % between 2005 
and 2050) in all public pensions  
 
Dependency Employment Take-up Benefit ratio
ratio rate     ratio 




2)   Pop(15-64) Pop(15-64)  Pop65+
 GDP per 
worker
BE 10,4 49,7 61,6 -8,2 -2,4 -8,1 6,9
DK 9,6 33,3 65,1 -3,7 -24,1 -4,6 0,6
DE 11,1 17,4 65,8 -10,3 -5,6 -29,6 -2,8
GR
ES 8,7 81,4 105,0 -19,7 -17,5 -1,3 14,9
FR 12,8 15,4 63,6 -7,0 -12,9 -25,7 -2,7
IE 4,6 141,9 107,0 -9,9 -20,7 19,5 46,0
IT 14,3 2,8 78,5 -13,8 -21,4 -35,3 -5,1
LU 10,0 73,7 56,3 -31,1 16,2 16,8 15,6
NL 7,4 51,4 71,9 -2,1 -19,3 -4,3 5,1
AT 13,2 -7,5 84,5 -10,1 -43,3 -32,3 -6,4
PT 11,5 80,3 88,5 -0,9 -3,9 -20,1 16,6
FI 10,4 32,0 72,9 -7,7 -25,2 -6,0 -1,9
SE 10,4 8,5 45,6 -6,2 -2,0 -26,7 -2,2
UK 6,7 28,3 64,2 -1,8
CY 7,0 183,5 94,4 -16,2 12,4 19,8 73,0
CZ 8,5 65,9 109,3 -3,6 -36,8 -9,1 6,1
EE 7,1 -41,4 60,3 -7,7 -26,8 -73,1 5,8
HU 10,7 60,1 79,4 -10,3 -33,4 16,3 8,1
LT 6,7 28,5 72,1 -16,0 -27,3 0,1 -0,4
LV 6,4 -13,4 62,7 -11,1 -20,6 -40,7 -3,7
MT 7,5 -6,4 80,8 -13,6 -10,5 -53,6 -9,5
PL
3) 13,7 -41,7 108,3 -26,7 -54,5 -68,0 -0,8
SK 7,4 20,3 122,0 -19,0 -34,0 -40,6 -8,2
SI 11,0 66,2 99,7 -8,5 -26,8 -7,5 9,3
EU15
 1) 10,5 22,1 72,1 -9,2 -15,2 -24,7 -1,5
EU10 10,9 2,6 100,0 -16,9 -43,6 -29,1 -7,7
EU12 
1) 11,5 23,2 74,8 -10,8 -13,8 -23,1 -4,9
EU25 
1) 10,6 20,9 76,1 -10,7 -20,2 -22,7 -1,9
1) excluding countries which have not provided information
2) The base year of the decomposition calculations is 2005 (insted of 2004 which was the base year of the projections)  
because the changes have been measured as the sum of changes over 5-year periods.
3) In the Polish projections, the number of pensioners has been corrected since the first publication of the results, 




start level, as 
% of GDP in 
2005 
2)
Public pensions, gross 
Due to growth in:
 
 
  -19-Table 3-1 shows an overview of the impact of the decomposed factors in terms of percent 
changes in public pension expenditure between 2005 and 2050. The relative increase in 
pension expenditure is a more useful basis to analyse the sensitivity of pension expenditure to 
different driving factors than the increases in percentage points of GDP. The findings can be 
summarised as follows: 
•  In almost all countries, the old-age dependency ratio weighs on the increase in 
pension spending by far more than the projected total increase of pensions, while the 
other factors offset part of the increase coming from the ageing of the population. The 
strongest offsetting effect comes from the decline in the benefit ratio in the EU15 and 
from the decline in the take-up ratio in the EU10 Member States. 
•  On average, if there were no offsetting factors, demographic pressure alone would 
push public pension spending upwards by over 70 per cent in real terms in the EU15 
and by 100 per cent in the EU10. Public pension expenditure would double from the 
current level in Spain, Ireland, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia
5. 
•  The offsetting factors, however, are projected to have a very large impact on the 
increase. In the EU15, they are expected to offset 70% of the pressure caused by 
demographic development, resulting in a real increase in public pensions of only 22%. 
In the EU10, almost all of the demographic pressure is projected to be offset by 
increasing employment rates, lower take-up of pensions and lower benefit ratios.  
•  Cyprus is the only country where the take-up ratio is projected to increase spending. 
This seems to be in contrast with labour force and employment projections, which 
assume a significant increase in the employment rate of older workers due to the 
cohort effect. However, in the pension expenditure projections this employment 
increase does not translate into a reduced pension take-up rate. Instead, the pension 
take-up behaviour is in line with the fact that no pension reforms have been enacted in 
recent years. . The benefit ratio is projected to increase in Cyprus, Ireland and 
Hungary. The offsetting impact of the take-up and benefit ratios of pensions is 
projected to be small in Belgium. 
•  The magnitude of the effect of increasing employment rates varies substantially across 
countries, depending on the current level of employment rates and the estimated effect 
of the recently undertaken labour market and pension reforms as well as the estimated 
cohort effect on employment. Countries with current low rates of employment such as 
Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia are projected to have the largest 
offsetting effect from increasing employment. 
 
                                                 
5   In Luxembourg, the pressure on public pension spending coming from changes in the dependency ratio, employment 
rate and eligibility rate should be considered together because a considerable part of the labour supply is provided 
by cross-border workers, making the trends of the employed persons and the resident population inconsistent with 
each other. Thus, the population components alone do not correctly reflect the driving forces of pension expenditure 
developments, while the three components together reflect the evolution of the number of persons accruing pension 
rights in the system. 
 
  -20- 
Dependency effect 
While the old-age dependency ratio is a mere demographic indicator, its impact as a driving 
force on pension expenditure is self-evident and there is a very clear correlation between these 
two indicators.  When compared with the point of departure in 2004, the pace of the ageing of 
the population will be the slowest in Sweden and Luxembourg and the fastest in Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Ireland. Here it is therefore the percent increases in the old-age 
dependency ratios that are measured, not the levels of the dependency ratios (the first picture 
of  Graph 3-1). In general, the EU10 countries will experience a sharper ageing of the 
population and a greater pressure on public pension spending due to ageing than the EU15 
countries, while the latter start from a higher level of old-age dependency ratios and pension 
spending in 2004. In the EU15, the old-age dependency ratio will double, which is estimated 
to lead to an increase of about 70% in public pension spending, while in the EU10, a 160% 
increase in the old-age dependency ratio is estimated to double pension spending. 
 
Graph 3-1  Increase in public pension expenditure (p.p. of GDP between 2004 and 2050) 
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Employment rates are projected to increase in all countries, although to varying degrees. In 
general, larger increases in employment rates are projected for countries with currently low 
employment rates and high unemployment rates. Particularly large increases in employment 
are projected for Poland (+14 p.p. by 2050) and increases of over 10 p.p. also for Spain, 
Slovakia, Lithuania and Cyprus.  
Employment rate increases are fastest at the beginning of the projection period. In the EU15 
and most of the EU10 countries, over two thirds of the employment rate increase is projected 
  -21-to occur by 2015, while in Hungary it is projected to last until 2020 and in Poland and 
Slovakia until 2025. Thus, the offsetting impact of the increased employment rates on public 
pension expenditure will mainly occur before 2015. Graph 3-2 below shows the 
interdependence between these variables. Overall, a six percentage point increase in the 
employment rate is projected to result in a reduction of 10% in public pension expenditure 
(corresponding to one percentage point of GDP). This relationship is quite common as can be 
seen from the graphs below.  
Over the period 2015-2030, employment increases have only a minor offsetting impact on 
public pension expenditure, except in Poland and Slovakia. In Poland, the employment rate is 
projected to increase further by almost 8 percentage points, offsetting 13% of pension 
expenditure (over 1 percentage point relative to GDP), while in Slovakia a 6 percentage point 
increase in employment will offset 9% of pension expenditure (a good 0.5 percentage point 
relative to GDP). After 2030, employment rates will decrease in the EU10 and will 
consequently have an increasing impact on public pension expenditure. 
 
Graph 3-2  Employment effect on the decrease in public pension spending during the 
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Take-up ratio effect 
The pension take-up ratios, i.e. the number of pensioners relative to the number of persons 
aged 65 and more, are projected to decrease in all countries (with the exception of Cyprus). 
On the average, in the EU15, the take-up ratio is projected to fall by about 20 persons (from 
144 to 124 relative to 100 elderly persons) and in the EU10 by over 70 persons (from 199 to 
125). Large decreases in the pension take-up ratio over the period 2005-2050 are projected in 
particular for Poland (by 90 persons), Austria (by almost 70 persons) and the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia (by about 60 persons relative to 100 elderly persons). In 
contrast, the number of pensioners relative to the number of older people in the population is 
projected to remain, by and large, unchanged in Belgium, Germany and Sweden. 
The changes in the take-up ratios include, first of all, changes in the number of people 
receiving pensions. While under current policies almost all people over 65 years of age 
  -22-receive pensions, policies have been put in place to increase the effective retirement age and 
to reduce the number of persons taking up pensions before the standard retirement age. Many 
countries have also increased the statutory retirement age, and will increase it still further. 
Furthermore, the composition of the pensioner population may change due to other reforms. 
For instance, the take-up of pensions by women may increase thanks to their increasing 
participation in the labour market and the acquisition of their own pension rights, while the 
take-up of survivors' pensions may decrease. 
The pension take-up ratio has a clear linear relationship with its effect on public pension 
expenditure, when measured as per cent changes from the initial level (first picture of Graph 
3-3). When the change in the take-up ratio is measured as numbers of persons and its impact 
on pension expenditure as a percentage point of GDP (second picture of Graph 3-3), the initial 
levels make the relationship appear less clear. In particular, the initial levels of take-up ratios 
are significantly higher in the EU10 countries than in the EU15. Towards the end of the 
projection period there is a significant convergence in the take-up ratios across countries. The 
effect of decreasing take-up ratios is spread over the whole projection period, however, with a 
stronger effect in the first half of the projection period. In the EU15, two thirds of the effect is 
projected to materialise before 2030 and in the EU10 three quarters.  
Graph 3-3  Pension take-up ratio effect on the decrease in public pension spending 
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The benefit ratio effect 
Benefit ratio, average pension relative to output per worker (approximating the evolution of 
average wages), captures several features. It covers the projected evolution of average 
pensions, affected by both increases of pensions and the composition of pensioners, and the 
projected evolution of average wages, affected by both of increases of wages and the 
composition of wage earners. Thus, several factors can affect the evolution of benefit ratios, 
including
6: 
                                                 
6   Country-specific features have been described in the country notes describing the main characteristics of 
national pension systems and the methodologies and models used in the projection exercise. The notes are 
available at the website: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/epc/epc_country_fiches_en.htm
 
  -23-•  Indexation rules of pensions which are applied to the pool of pensions that remain 
in payment from year to year and most affect the evolution of average pensions; 
•  The evolution of average pensions is also influenced by the levels of initial 
pensions, affected by entitlement rules (accrual of pension rights, ceilings, 
supplements), and the levels of expiring pensions; 
•  Other factors applied to the initial level or annual adjustment of pensions such as 
life expectancy adjustment and sustainability factor corrections; 
•  The timing of reforms; for instance, a change in the indexation rule affects the 
evolution of average pensions more in the transition period than in the steady 
state when the change has been fully implemented;  
•  Systemic pension reforms such as a switch from public schemes to private 
schemes and their timing; 
•  The composition of pensioners, notably the pools of pensioners on minimum (or 
flat-rate) pensions and earnings-related pensions, through the composition of new 
and expiring pensioners; 
•  Wage developments, assumed to be equal to the labour productivity growth rates; 
•  Composition of wage earners (no explicit assumption was made on changes in 
the composition of wage earners, e.g. regarding part-time vs. full-time work, 
education or wage level). 
 
The benefit ratios embedded in the projections show a declining trend for almost all countries. 
In only four countries (CY, IE, LU and HU) is it projected that average pension benefits will 
increase relative to wages. The average fall in the benefit ratio is projected to be 24% in the 
EU15 and 30% in the EU10 between 2005 and 2050. 
 
A projected decrease in the benefit ratio mainly reflects the fact that pensions in payment will 
not be raised at the same pace as the wages increase for those who stay in the labour market. 
There are several reasons for this. Firstly, particularly large decreases in the benefit ratios are 
projected in countries that have recently moved (Italy) or decided to move to price indexation 
such as France
7 and Austria
8 and that are in a transition from a wage indexation towards price 
indexation. Secondly, as far as public pensions are concerned, the projected decrease in the 
benefit ratio in many EU10 Member States is partially due to the switch to private schemes. 
Thirdly, many Member States have undertaken measures that adapt pension benefits to future 
demographic or employment changes such adapting the pension benefit to life expectancy of 
new pensioners (SE, LV, PL, IT, FI and FR) or adapting the pension benefit to the 
relationship between the numbers of the employed and pensioners (DE).  
The projected increases in the benefit ratio may in some cases reflect the maturation of the 
pension system, i.e. the fact that higher pensions will be accrued through contributions paid to 
the system during longer working careers. In some countries, in particular Ireland, the benefit 
ratio increases significantly at the beginning of the projection period. This is due to the 
Government’s commitments to increase the level of pensions up to 2007, which are included 
in the projections. In Hungary, the projected increase in the benefit ratio is mainly due to the 
                                                 
7   In France, the main social security pension scheme was moved to price indexation in 1987 and the public 
sector employees' scheme in 2003. 
8   Table 2-3 of the Annex of the main report (European Economy, Special Report 2006:1) describes the 
indexation rules of Member States’ pension schemes.  
  -24-introduction of taxation on pensions, which will increase gross pensions, measured by the 
benefit ratio, while net pensions will not increase at the same pace.  
Graph 3-4 below investigates more in depth the extent to which the evolution of average 
public pensions affects the benefit ratio. It should be noted, in particular, that all countries 
project positive real growth rates in average public pensions over the whole projection period 
(with the exceptions of Poland, where the real increase in average public pensions is projected 
to be negative between 2035-2050, and Latvia between 2045-2050.) On average, in the EU15, 
the average public pension in real terms is projected to increase by 1.2% per year and in the 
EU10 by 1.8% per year, in the latter despite the fact that the social security pensions 
constitute a decreasing part of the total statutory pension provision in many countries. 
Looking at the trend line, it suggests that an annual real increase of average pensions by 2% 
would keep the benefit ratio unchanged, which would be close to the assumed labour 
productivity growth rate, 1.8% per year in the EU25 over the period 2005-2050.  The trend 
line also demonstrates that the benefit ratio is very sensitive to a change in the annual real 
increase in pensions. For instance, an annual real increase in public pensions by only 1% 
would reduce the benefit ratio by over 50% over the whole projection period.  
When the interrelation between the evolutions of average pensions and benefit ratio is 
investigated over different time periods, we see quite different patterns. All countries are very 
close to the trend line in the period 2030-2050, while the picture is very scattered at the 
beginning (2005-2015) of the projection period. This is largely due to the fact that the benefit 
ratio is affected by general economic and wage developments, which, in fact, in the projection 
exercise are quite diversified across countries at the beginning of the projection period, while 
relatively standardised assumptions for all countries were used over the period 2030-2050.   
In particular, over the period 2004-2015, it is striking that in some EU10 countries (EE, LV, 
SK), despite substantial annual real increases in average pensions (between 3 and 5 per cent 
per year) benefit ratios fall. This can be explained by the assumed very rapid increases in 
labour productivity; for instance by over 5% per year in Latvia and Estonia. 
This analysis suggests that the benefit ratio alone and its impact on the increase in pension 
spending are quite difficult to interpret because they also reflect changes in labour 
productivity assumption. Benefit ratio can decrease despite a positive development in average 
pensions. Moreover, the benefit ratio seems to be very sensitive to the annual real increase of 
average pensions: small changes in average pension increase appear as large numbers in 
benefit ratios. It should also be borne in mind that the benefit ratio captures features of two 
different types, namely, changes in average pensions which are largely driven by the 
indexation rules and changes in average wages which are driven by the given assumptions on 
labour productivity growth rates. If those assumptions are too optimistic, the pension 
expenditure projections will exaggerate the fall in the benefit ratio. Therefore, it is difficult to 
draw firm conclusions as to whether the falling benefit ratios represent a possible adequacy 
problem.   
  -25-Graph 3-4  Projected real increases in average public pensions and in the benefit ratio 
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The graphs above (Graph 3-4) show the benefit ratio effect on public pension spending in 
terms of percentage increase from 2005 to 2050, while Graph 3-5 shows the effect on 
pension spending in terms of the percentage point increase of GDP. While the latter picture is 
very similar to the fourth picture in Graph 3-4, the differences in country positions are 
affected by their starting positions regarding the level of public pension spending in 2005. 
  -26-Graph 3-5 Projected real increases in average public pensions and the benefit ratio 
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3.2.  Timing of projected increases in average public pensions 
Instead of analysing the timing of the changes in benefit ratios, it is more useful to look at the 
timing of the projected increases in average pensions. These changes reflect more directly the 
impact of pension policies and, hence, make it possible to analyse whether the projected 
changes can be explained by the indexation rules and whether they are comparable across 
countries with the same type of indexation rules. 
Graph 3-6 below shows the average annual real increases of average public pensions over 5-
year periods from 2005 to 2050 in comparison with the labour productivity (wage) growth 
rates for the EU15 and EU10. For the EU10, it also shows the development of all statutory 
pensions (in the graph: ‘EU10 to’), including the part of pensions which is being switched 
into private pension funds. 
In the EU15 the average real increase of average public pension between 2005 and 2050 is 
projected to be 1.2% per year in comparison with labour productivity growth of 1.7% per 
year. The difference between the average growth rates widens from an initial 0.3 percentage 
point difference to 0.7 percentage points between 2020 and 2035, after which it contracts 
slightly. While the labour productivity (and wage) growth rate is assumed to increase from the 
current lower levels to 1.7-1.8 over the period 2010-2050, the average pensions do not seem 
to fully follow this development.  
In the EU10, the overall picture is quite different from that in the EU15. The average annual 
real growth rates are higher: 1.8% per year for public pensions and 2.3% for total pensions 
(including the statutory private pension), compared with a 2.7% increase in labour 
productivity. Moreover, the growth rates are significantly higher at the beginning of the 
projection period, starting from a level of around 3% per year, though they decrease towards 
the end of the projection period. This shape of the evolution holds for both public and total 
pensions and reflects the assumed labour productivity development which affects the average 
  -27-level of pensions through the accrual of pension rights from higher wages, resulting in higher 
new pensions, and through the indexation of old pensions in countries where pensions are at 
least partially indexed to wages. The only point at which the relatively close interrelation 
between the growth rates of pensions and wages breaks down is the period 2010-2015 when 
pensions seem to increase significantly less than wages. This development is mainly driven 
Poland where the development of pension levels slows down due to the start of pensions 
being paid out from the reformed NDC scheme.    
An examination of the developments in individual countries reveals that the growth rates of 
pensions differ more than those of wages. Over the whole projection period, the average 
increase in pensions exceeds that of wages in Ireland, Luxembourg, Cyprus and Hungary. 
Despite a close indexation of pensions to wages, these also reflect discretionary increases in 
pension levels (in Hungary also an increase in gross pensions to compensate the introduction 
of taxation on pensions). In contrast, in many countries, the increase in average pensions will 
be at a pace that is 0.6-0.8 percentage points lower than average wage growth. These include 
countries such as Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Sweden and Estonia. Moreover, in Malta 
and Poland, the gap between the average growth rates is over 1 percentage point per year. 
These developments are driven by recent reforms to switch to price indexation in France and 
Austria, the indexation of pension ceilings to prices in Malta, the introduction of sustainability 
factor in Germany and the introduction of notionally defined contribution systems in Italy, 
Sweden and Poland.  
Graph 3-6 Projected annual real increases in average public pensions and labour 
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Graph 3-7 and Graph 3-8 below analyse annual real increases in average public pensions 
across countries. Countries have been grouped mainly by the type of their indexation regimes. 
However, it must be borne in mind that even the indexation regimes are hardly ever fully 
identical in two countries. Moreover, the average pension development is affected also by 
factors other than merely the indexation rule, including life expectancy adjustments, 
  -28-sustainability factor corrections, the timing of the effect of past reforms and transitional 
periods as reforms are implemented. Also, the accrual of pension rights and the valorisation of 
past earnings are important determinants for the start level of new pensions which may differ 
from the average level of pensions in payment. And lastly, the composition of the pensioner 
population (those with flat-rate vs. earnings-related pensions, the difference between new and 
expiring pensions) may have important effects on the development of the average. 
The lowest increases in average public pensions are projected in Italy (0.8% per year) and in 
Austria and Germany (0.9% per year), while the highest increases will occur in Ireland (2.4% 
per year) and in Luxembourg (2.2% per year). Measured over the 5-year periods, the average 
annual increases for the EU15 as a whole are relatively stable, with the exception of the first 
period, 2004-2010, when the growth rate is projected to be 0.9% (in comparison with the 
1.2% average increase over the whole projection period). This figure is dominated by the 
German projections, which project a fall of 0.9% per year over the period 2005-2010 due to 
the sustainability factor correction. In later 5-year periods, the German indexation rule 
appears to produce somewhat similar increases to the French system. 
  -29-Graph 3-7  Annual real increases in average public pensions, countries (EU15 and some 
EU10 countries) grouped according to the type of the indexation of pensions 
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In the first group of the EU15 countries (ES, FR, IT and AT), pensions are indexed to prices 
(or close to prices); the Italian pension scheme is a defined-contribution scheme and others 
are defined-benefit schemes. Despite the fact that the formal indexation of pensions is similar, 
relatively large differences in annual real increases of average pensions are projected, growth 
rates varying mainly between 0.5 and 2 percent per year. Moreover, the evolution of real 
increases shows different patterns for different countries: while the growth rate increases over 
time for France, it is on a declining trend in Italy, Austria and particularly in Spain.  
The declining trend in Italy and Austria can be explained by the latest reforms, which will 
result in lower initial pensions than hitherto due to the new rules. In Italy, new pensions will 
be based on the defined-contribution principle and the level of new pensions takes account of 
the life expectancy of the retiree. Also in Austria, the link between contributions and benefits 
has been tightened through the calculation of the pensionable wage over the whole work 
career and through the introduction of stronger actuarial reductions for early pensions.   
  -30-In Spain, the high increase at the beginning of the projection period is explained partly by the 
fact that the Government has committed to increase the level of minimum pensions 
substantially during its term of office. The rise in minimum pensions pushes average pensions 
up still further during the first years of the projections. Also, the level of new pensions has 
been rising at a higher pace than wages in recent years and this development is projected to 
continue until 2010.  The subsequent decrease in average growth rates represents a return to 
more 'normal' growth rates but may also be affected by an increasing number of lower 
pensions due to the higher participation of women with partial careers. At the end of the 
projection period, the substantially lower increase in average pensions than in wages is mainly 
due to demographic dynamics. In particular, the end of the baby-boom effect results in a 
smaller number of new pensioners, which pushes the average level of pensions down. Also, 
the increase in life expectancy increases the number of pensioners with low pensions.  
The second group (BE, PT, FI, CZ, CY and MT) consists of countries where pensions are 
indexed by a mixed index with greater weight given to prices than wages (or where the 
greater part of pensions is linked to a price index and the smaller part to a wage index, as is 
the case in BE (private sector pensions linked to a price index plus 0.5 percentage points and 
public sector pensions to a wage index) and CY (minimum pensions linked to wages and 
earnings-related pensions to prices)).  
In this group of countries, annual real increases of average public pensions are very similar in 
Belgium, Finland and Portugal at about 1.5 percent per year over most of the projection 
period. In contrast, annual real increases of pensions are projected to be higher in the Czech 
Republic and Cyprus. 
In the Czech Republic, the annual increase is between 2 and 2.8 percent per year, reflecting 
partly the assumption of higher labour productivity (and wage) growth rate than in other 
countries in this group, in particular up to 2030. This results in a more generous indexation of 
pensions (prices plus a third of the average real wage growth). Moreover, the changes in the 
composition of the pensioner population lead to an increasing average pension. New pensions 
are higher than pensions in payment due to the fact that their replacement rate (relative to 
wage) is projected to be relatively constant and that the trend is moving towards old-age 
pensions and away from the lower disability and survivors' pensions. 
In Malta, an indexation close to prices dominates because the ceiling of the pensionable 
income is adjusted by a price index (cost-of-living adjustment), the minimum and maximum 
of the earnings-related pensions by only 2/3 of the price indexation despite the fact that the 
earnings-related pensions between the minimum and maximum are adjusted by 2/3 of wage 
increases in the respective occupation of the pensioner. Over time, these rules lead to 
earnings-related pensions approaching the maximum pension, thus producing virtually flat-
rate pensions only
9. This also explains why annual real increases of pensions approach zero in 
the middle of the projection period. 
The third group (DE, LU, SE and SI) includes countries where public earnings-related 
pensions are indexed to wages. The projected real increases in public pensions are very 
similar in Luxembourg and Slovenia: slightly over 2.5 percent per year at the beginning of the 
projection period and decreasing to a below 2 percent increase towards the end. In LU, the 
                                                 
9   A reform proposal, including a change in this indexation rule, has been proposed in March 2006 but has not 
yet been concluded.  
  -31-recurring increases and decreases of the growth rates are due to the rule which requires 
pensions to be adjusted to real wage increases every two years and which therefore means that  
the calculation of average increases over 5-year periods includes an unequal number of 
adjustments in consequent periods. 
In Germany, according to the basic rule, pensions are indexed to gross wages minus 
contributions to pension schemes (this reduction is called the Riester factor). However, an 
additional rule stipulates that the index be modified with a sustainability factor which takes 
account of the changes in the ratio between the number of pensioners and employees. This 
modification plays a particularly important role at the beginning of the projection period when 
the old-age dependency ratio rises fastest in Germany (see Graph 3-12). The Riester factor 
also holds down the index adjustments of pensions because contributions to private pension 
schemes increase over the coming years. In fact, the index adjustments of pensions are 
expected to remain low even in nominal terms up to 2010. 
In Sweden, in the reformed pension system, at the aggregate level pensions are indexed to 
wages but, at the individual level, when a pension is granted the adjustments are front-loaded. 
This means that an additional increase of 1.6% is granted on the new pension at the time of 
retirement, offset by a respective reduction in the index increase in the subsequent years. In 
the transition phase, this rule results in pensions increasing on average less than wages, but in 
a steady state the increases will be equal to a wage indexation. Additionally, the level of new 
pensions is modified to take account of the life expectancy of the retiree.  
The fourth group (DK, NL and IE) consists of countries with flat-rate public pensions, 
which are indexed to wages in DK and NL and raised by discretionary decision in IE (in the 
projections, wage indexation is applied). The annual increases are around 1.5 percent per year, 
except at the beginning of the projection period in IE, where it is 4-4.5% per year. The 
average 1.5 % increases in Denmark and the Netherlands are lower than for earnings-related 
pensions with a wage indexation (as in, for example, LU and SI) due to the fact that the 
average of the flat-rate pensions is affected only by the indexation, while the average of 
earnings-related pensions is also affected by higher new pensions that have accrued in line 
with earnings increases. For Ireland, the average of public pensions is affected by factors 
other than mere indexation such as government commitments to raise the level of pensions in 
the short run and the maturation of the contributory pension scheme, which provides higher 
pensions than the non-contributory scheme, over the longer term.  
  -32-Graph 3-8   Annual real increases in average public and total pensions, EU10 countries 
with a switch from the public scheme into statutory private schemes  
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In the group of 6 of the EU10 countries (EE, HU, LV, LT, SK and PL) which have 
switched a part of the social security pension scheme into private schemes, the indexation 
varies. Only in Poland are pensions indexed to prices. In Estonia and Latvia, pensions are 
indexed 50:50 to prices and to the growth of the social security contribution revenues, the 
latter taking account of changes in wages and employment. In Hungary and Slovakia, 
pensions are indexed 50:50 to prices and wages. In Lithuania, pensions are adjusted by 
discretionary decision but the projections adjust them in line with wage increases.    
For these countries, the left-hand picture shows the projected increases in public pensions and 
the right-hand picture that in total pensions. The latter is more important because it includes 
the whole statutory pension provision, while the public pensions picture is biased in that 
public pensions constitute a decreasing part of total pensions in the future. A general feature 
of the projected annual increases is that there is a declining trend for all countries. This holds 
also when total pensions are considered and thus confirms that the declining trend of public 
pensions is not only due to the switch into private funded schemes. In particular, it is 
influenced by the assumptions on labour productivity growth rates, and hence wage increases, 
which were assumed to be particularly high in the first part of the projection period. However, 
the pace of the decrease in average pensions varies considerably across countries and it might 
not be fully explained by the impact of the assumed wage increases.  
In particular, in Poland, annual real increases of total pensions are projected to approach zero 
towards the end of the projection period. This overall development is heavily influenced by 
the introduction of the notional defined-contribution scheme, and more precisely by the 
timing of the reform’s impact on payment of pensions from the NDC scheme. The first new 
pensions from the NDC scheme will be paid out in 2009. Over time, these pensions will be 
become notably lower than pensions from the old defined-benefit scheme. Moreover, the 
take-up of early pensions is assumed to be restricted from 2007 onwards. These factors weigh 
on the increase in average pensions during the period 2010-2015. From 2015 onwards, the 
partial switch of pensions into private funded schemes will further reduce the level of public 
pensions paid out because people will increasingly start to receive a part of their pensions 
  -33-from the private scheme. At the end of the projection period, the increase in average (public 
and total) pensions slows down, first, due to the assumed slowdown in wage growth rates, and 
second, due to the increase in life expectancy; both of these factors will directly reduce the 
level of new pensions. Thus, over a long part of the projection period, expiring pensions will 
be higher than new pensions, which will hold down the evolution of average pensions. 
In Latvia, the annual real increases in public pensions are projected to become negative in the 
period 2045-2050. This is explained by the phasing-in of the switch into private schemes, the 
completion of which may still have some effect in this period. The stronger decreasing trend 
in public pensions over the whole projection period than in other countries that are also 
switching can be explained by the fact that the part that will be switched into private funds 
will gradually increase.  
In Estonia, a sharp decrease in the growth rate of both public and average pensions in Estonia 
after the first 5-year period 2004-2010 is striking. This seems to be explained by exceptional 
increases in pension levels during the first 5-year period, based on discretionary decisions 
taken in recent years. However, the low and flat profile of growth rates from 2015 onwards 
also differs significantly from other countries. Changes in labour productivity growth rates 
over the projection period are slower and would suggest a slower downward trend for average 
pension increases. 
For Hungary, the projected decrease in the growth rates of public pensions is significantly 
lower than for other countries that have also switched a part of social security pension scheme 
into private funded schemes. The Hungarian country fiche explains this feature by the 
dynamic evolution of the average pension level, which will be raised by new pensions that 
will be higher than the pensions in payment due to the assumed high labour productivity – and 
hence also wage – growth rates.  
 
Summing up, while it can be concluded that in countries with a price indexation of pensions 
the projected annual increases of pensions are projected to be lower than in countries with a 
mixed or full indexation to wages, it appears that the indexation of pensions alone is not a 
very powerful explanatory factor for the evolution of average pensions. The projected 
evolution of average pensions can differ quite significantly even across countries which have 
basically relatively similar indexation rules. There are a great number of factors which also 
affect the evolution of average pensions. For instance, the additional rules which modify the 
basic indexation rule can have significant effects. These include factors such as life 
expectancy and sustainability adjustments, minimum and maximum rules, etc. And pension 
reforms can also change the picture substantially, e.g. through altered accrual and eligibility 
rules, and discretionary decisions to raise pension levels. 
 
  -34-3.3.  Timing of the effect of the driving factors 
Above we have analysed the effect of the different driving factors on the increase in public 
pension expenditure. In order to have a clearer picture of the timing of the various driving 
factors it is useful to look at the 5-year growth rates of the driving factors instead of the 
cumulative changes over the whole projection period. 
In the EU15 (Graph 3-9), while the old-age dependency ratios continue to increase over the 
whole projection period, the pace of the increases is the fastest during the period 2010-2015 
and 2020-2035 (measured as an increase over a 5-year period). In the EU15 Member States, 
the timing of ageing varies quite considerably. This is seen in Graph 3-12 which shows the 
annual growth rates of old-age dependency ratios for the largest Member States. The pressure 
for increases in public pension expenditure follows, by and large, the pressure coming from 
the ageing of the population, though it shows a lower convex curve than the increases in the 
old-age dependency ratio. The difference between these curves also shows the impact of the 
offsetting factors on pension expenditure. These factors are projected to be the most effective 
during the periods of the highest pressure coming from ageing, i.e. in the periods 2005-2015 
and 2025-2035. 
Looking at the first decade of the projections and the impact of the offsetting factors, it is seen 
that the impact of the increasing employment rates is projected to materialise almost fully 
during this period. Its impact is also the strongest of the driving factors during this period. 
Taking into account the assumptions of "no policy change" and the fact that only the impact 
of enacted reforms was incorporated in the employment projections, it is a plausible result that 
its impact materialises over the first decade.  
The decrease in the pension take-up ratios takes place over a longer period than the 
employment impact. Moreover, it seems to react to the increase in the old-age dependency 
ratio so that its impact on the increase in public pension expenditure is dampened. This is seen 
in Graph 3-9, which shows its effect strengthening during the periods 2010-2015 and 2025-
2035.  
The impact of benefit ratios is projected to be spread relatively evenly over the whole 
projection period in the EU15. However, it also seems to become somewhat stronger in 
periods when the pressure of ageing is strongest, notably 2015-2035.  
 
Annex 1 presents the timing of the effect of the driving factors for each country. Not 
surprisingly, the timing and strength of the driving and offsetting factors varies considerably 
across countries. It appears that, in a great number of countries, considerable pressures 
coming from the peaks in the dependency ratios are flattened by the offsetting factors, notably 
by take-up ratios and benefit ratios to relatively smooth changes in pension expenditure. 
   
Annex 2 presents a further decomposition of the take-up ratio for those countries which 
provided necessary data on the number of pensioners by age group. This data provides 
additional insight into the question of the degree to which the changes in the take-up ratio are 
due to changes in the take-up within age groups and changes in the age composition of the 
population. It appears that, in general, the population composition effect, measured by the 
ratio of persons aged 55-64 relative to persons aged 65+, has a strong impact on changes in 
the take-up ratio. However, it also reveals that a number of countries project considerable 
decreases in the take-up of pensions in the age groups below 65 and in some countries (AT, 
PL) even in the age group over 65.  
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Graph 3-9  Timing of the effect of the driving factors on the 5-year growth rates of 
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In the EU10 (Graph 3-10, Graph 3-12), the pace of ageing is stronger and earlier than in the 
EU15. The highest growth rates in the old-age dependency ratios will take place already in 
2010-2020, while in the EU15 the ageing is fastest in 2025-2035. Moreover, in the EU10, 
there is a second acceleration in the old-age dependency ratios in the 2040s. As far as 
different Member States are concerned, the timing of ageing will take place at about the same 
time (Graph 3-12). Concerning the pressure on public pensions, the growth rates of public 
pension expenditure follow the ageing pressure to a significantly lesser degree than in the 
EU15. In particular, at the beginning of the projection period, the offsetting factors are 
projected to play a very strong role. Also during the 2040s, the take-up ratios of pensions are 
projected to offset the effect of the old-age dependency ratio. This seems to be, however, 
mostly due to the effect of population dynamics, i.e. the changing sizes of the age group 55-64 
and those aged 65+. The graphs in Annex show for individual countries that the pension take-
up ratios within the age groups remain relatively unchanged at the end of the projection 
period. Unfortunately, a great number of countries did not provide data on the number of 
pensioners by age group and, consequently, summaries at EU15 and EU10 level were not 
possible. 
Concerning the benefit ratio effect on public pension expenditure, it will evidently have a 
stronger effect in the EU10 Member States than the EU15 because in many countries the 
public pension provision will decrease as statutory private pension provision increases. This 
policy change will take place mainly between 2015 and 2040, during which period the benefit 
ratios of total pensions will grow faster than those of public pensions, pushing total pension 
expenditure up (Graph 3-11). Thereafter, the growth rates for the benefit ratio (and total 
expenditure) of all pensions will be about 3% higher for each 5-year period. However, even 
taking into account the increasing private pension provision, at the end of the projection 
period the growth rates of total pension expenditure reflect the ageing pressure only slightly 
better than the growth rates of public pensions alone. In contrast, at the beginning of the 
  -36-projection period, the increasing statutory private pension provision does not yet have any 
effect on the benefit ratio of public pensions because the pensions in payment are still based 
on the pension system before the switch into private statutory schemes. 
The projected decreasing benefit ratio of total pensions is plausible to the extent that it is due 
to the assumed high wage growth rates during the first part of the projection period. However, 
it might be asked whether there are other elements which unduly reduce the benefit ratio to 
significant degrees during the period 2005-2015. Also, it is difficult to explain why the 
offsetting effect of the benefit ratio should become stronger at the very end of the projection 
period, as appears to be the case for some Member States (EE, LV, PL; see Annex). 
The projected increase in the employment rates has an essentially stronger offsetting effect in 
the EU10 than in the EU15, and is projected to last until 2025. Thereafter, employment rates 
are projected to decrease, which will have an adverse effect on pension expenditure relative to 
GDP.  
The effect of decreasing pension take-up ratios is projected to last virtually over the whole 
projection period in the EU10; only during the period 2030-2035, when the pressure from 
ageing is increasing at its slowest pace, will it be neutral regarding the increase in pension 
expenditure. The relative offsetting effect of pension take-up ratios is projected to be strongest 
during the periods of rapid ageing (2010-2020 and 2040-2050). However, this seems to be 
more the effect of the composition of population age groups than a 'real' decrease in the take-
up ratios within the age groups. This feature also comes out clearly in country-specific 
decompositions (Annex).  
Nevertheless, Annex also shows that many of the EU10 countries project a significant 
decrease in the pension take-up ratio in the 55-64 age group. This trend is plausible given that 
the current take-up of pensions in this age group is significantly higher than in the EU15 
countries. Many of the EU10 countries also have policies in place which will gradually raise 
the statutory retirement age, which is currently below 65 in most EU10 countries.  
Graph 3-10  Timing of the effect of the driving factors on the 5-year growth rates of 
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  -37-Graph 3-11   Timing of the effect of statutory private pensions on 5-year growth rates of 
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  -38-4.  SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
4.1.  Overall look at the sensitivity analyses 
The sensitivity scenarios were all run in relation to the baseline scenario, and only one 
parameter was changed in each sensitivity scenario from that in the baseline scenario. The 
following sensitivity tests were run: 
•  The higher life expectancy scenario assumed an increase in life expectancy, which 
corresponds roughly to an increase in life expectancy at birth of 1-1.5 years by 2050. 
Specifically, it was introduced by decreasing the age-specific mortality rates by 15% 
linearly over the period 2004-2050. 
•  The higher employment rate scenario assumed that the employment rate would 
increase by 1 p.p. over the period 2005-2015 and would thereafter remain at a 1 p.p. 
higher level in the period 2015-2050 compared with the baseline projection. The 
higher employment rate was assumed to be achieved by lowering the rate of structural 
unemployment (i.e. the NAIRU). 
•  The higher employment rate of older workers scenario assumed that the employment 
rate of older workers would increase by 5 p.p. over 2005-2015 and thereafter remain at 
a 5 p.p. higher level over the period 2015-2050 compared with the baseline projection. 
The higher employment rate of older workers is assumed to be achieved through a 
reduction in the inactive population. In terms of total employment rates, this scenario 
results in an increase of about 1 p.p., thus coming very close to the higher employment 
rate scenario. 
•  The higher and lower labour productivity scenarios assumed an increase/decrease in 
the labour productivity growth rate by 0.25 p.p. over 2005-2015, thereafter remaining 
at the 0.25 p.p. higher/lower level in comparison with the labour productivity growth 
rate in the baseline projection.  
•  The higher and lower interest rate scenarios assumed interest rates of 4 and 2% vs. 
3% in the baseline scenario.  
The size of the introduced shocks explained above and modelled in the sensitivity scenarios is 
not easily comparable and caution should be exercised when interpreting whether the results 
are more sensitive to one factor than another. However, one way of comparing the introduced 
shocks in the higher life expectancy and higher employment rate scenarios is to compare the 
change in the economic dependency ratio that they cause. It appears that the increase in the 
number of pensioners in the higher life expectancy scenario increases the economic 
dependency ratio (inactive persons relative to the employed) by around 5% while the increase 
in the number of employed persons in higher employment rate scenarios (one percentage 
point increase in the overall employment rate or 5 percentage point increase in the 
employment rate of older workers) decreases the economic dependency ratio by around 1.5%. 
Table 4-1 provides an indication of the sensitivity of the pension expenditure projections to 
various assumptions. Overall, it shows that the public pension expenditure projections are 
most sensitive to the assumption of life expectancy and the assumption of labour productivity 
growth rate, while the assumptions of higher employment rates have a more limited impact on 
the results and the assumption of interest rate does not affect the results on public pension 
  -39-spending (with the exception of SE and FI). The magnitude of the impact of different 
assumptions on pension spending depends critically on the pension system design: how 
responsive the system is to changes in economic and demographic developments. Thus, the 
magnitude of the impact varies across countries. 
A higher life expectancy should have a larger impact on pension spending in a defined-
benefit scheme where the initial level of the pension does not depend on the time spent in 
retirement. In contrast, a defined-contribution scheme accommodates the time spent in 
retirement as the accumulated pension capital will be converted into annuities at the time of 
retirement and account is taken of the increased life expectancy. 
The impact of higher employment rates (whether overall employment rates or employment 
rates of older workers) on pension spending depends critically on what is assumed of how the 
gain in higher employment rates is achieved and how the pension system design responds to 
such changes. If a gain in higher employment rates is achieved through decreased 
unemployment rates, the spending on unemployment benefits will actually be reduced but the 
person moving from unemployment to employment will (usually) accrue more pension rights, 
thereby increasing the level of his pension and the overall spending on pensions. However, 
the higher employment rate also results in higher GDP and, consequently, the ratio between 
pension spending and GDP is not affected much
10. Similarly, when considering the change in 
the employment rate of older workers, the impact depends essentially on whether it increases 
the person’s pension rights or not. Only in the case of a defined-benefit pension system and if 
the higher employment rate of older workers were gained through a reduction of non-actuarial 
early pensions, would the decrease in pension spending relative to GDP be notable. In 
contrast, in a defined-contribution scheme, a higher accumulation of pension rights should 
keep the level of pension spending virtually unchanged but can result even in a small increase 
of pension expenditure (IT, SK). Despite the limited impact on pension expenditure, higher 
employment rates result in welfare gains both at the individual level, allowing higher earnings 
when still employed and higher pensions when retired, and for society, resulting in higher 
GDP and higher income per capita. 
Higher and lower labour productivity assumptions affect pension spending through their 
link to the increase in wages. In the projections it is assumed that real wages increase in line 
with labour productivity growth rates. The impact on pension spending depends directly on 
the extent to which pensions are indexed to wage increases. If pensions are indexed to wages, 
the share of pension spending relative to GDP should remain unchanged under different 
assumptions about the labour productivity growth rates, since the labour productivity growth 
rate determines both wage and pension growth. In contrast, if pensions are indexed to prices 
only (or to a hybrid index of wages and prices) and if the real wage growth rate increases, the 
share of pension spending relative to GDP will decrease and, conversely, in the event of lower 
wage growth rates, pension spending relative to GDP will increase. 
Higher and lower interest rates have no impact on pension spending (relative to GDP) as far 
as fully pay-as-you-go pension systems are concerned. Only in funded schemes does the 
interest rate assumption matter. A higher interest rate (and thus also a higher return on 
pension assets) helps the financing of the pension scheme and results in a higher accumulation 
                                                 
10   A similar conclusion on the strong interdependence between higher participation, GDP growth and fiscal 
pressure caused by age-related expenditure is drawn by the Australian Productivity Commission (2005) in 
its report 'Economic Implications of an Ageing Australia'.  
  -40-of pension funds if it concerns a defined-contribution scheme. In this case, the contribution 
rate remains unchanged but asset accumulation increases, also allowing higher pensions to be 
paid and thereby resulting in higher pension spending. In contrast, in a funded defined-benefit 
scheme (such as exists in the Netherlands in particular), pension expenditure is not affected 
but higher interest (return) rates allow lower contributions, which in turn result in a lower 
accumulation of pension assets. 
The results of the sensitivity scenarios can be summarised as follows:  
•  Higher life expectancy is projected to increase public pension expenditure by 0.3 
percentage points on average in the EU. The largest projected impacts on public 
pension expenditure are in DK, FR, PT and SI (by 0.6 p.p. of GDP) and in BE, MT, 
NL and SK by 0.5 p.p. The projected impact is smaller (0.2-0.3 p.p.) in countries with 
defined-contribution schemes (IT, LV, PL and SE) but not zero in any country. In DE, 
FI and UK, the impact is projected to be 0.2 p.p. and in EE and ES only 0.1 p.p. 
•  A higher employment rate and higher employment rate of older workers are 
projected to result in only small and rather similar changes in pension spending. In 
most countries, the level of public pension spending as a percentage of GDP will 
remain unchanged or only slightly changed (-0.1 p.p.). Only in Hungary and Slovenia 
are notable decreases (0.4-1.1 p.p.) projected, while somewhat smaller decreases (0.2-
0.4 p.p.) are projected in BE, CZ, LT, AT, PT. Moreover, a higher employment rate of 
older workers appears to have a stronger impact in DK, EE and FR than that generated 
by a general increase in employment. In contrast, the German sustainability factor is 
designed in such a way that pension spending responds to changes in employment and 
to the change in ratio between the numbers of employed and pensioners, thus resulting 
in no (virtual) change in the pension spending ratio. Some countries (IT, SK) also 
project a small increase in pension spending, which is a feasible result in a defined-
contribution scheme in particular because people in employment will accrue more 
pension rights.  
•  Higher and lower labour productivity result in relatively symmetric 
decreases/increases in the level of pension spending, of 0.3-0.4 percentage points of 
GDP on average. The changes are the greatest (0.7-1.6 p.p.) in CY, PT, ES, AT and 
MT, while in DK, DE, IE, LU, NL and SI pensions are projected to rise in line with 
earnings and (virtually) no change is projected.  
•  Higher and lower interest rates have no impact on the level of public pension 
expenditure in most countries. Only in Sweden do they have a noticeable impact: 
higher interest rates are projected to increase pension spending by 0.3 p.p. and lower 
interest rates to decrease spending by 0.3 p.p. This impact comes from the defined-
contribution funded public scheme. However, the interest rate plays a more important 
role in countries with funded occupational and private statutory schemes. A more 
noticeable impact is seen for total pension expenditure. Due to the impact of interest 
rates on funded schemes, total pension spending could increase/decrease by 0.5-1.1 
percentage points in EE, LV, LT, HU, SK and SE.  
Below, a closer look is taken at how the sensitivity scenarios impact on public pension 
expenditure and the driving factors, with the exception of the scenarios of higher and lower 
interest rates, which affect public pension spending only in Sweden and to a very minor 
degree in Finland. 
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BE 5,1 0,5 -0,2 -0,3 -0,4 0,3 0,0 0,0
CZ 5,5 0,4 -0,2 -0,3 -0,3 0,2 0,0 0,0
DK 3,3 0,6 0,0 -0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
DE 1,7 0,2 -0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
EE -2,5 0,1 0,0 -0,4 -0,2 0,2 0,0 0,0
GR
ES 7,1 0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,9 1,0 0,0 0,0
FR 2,0 0,6 -0,1 -0,4 -0,4 0,5 0,0 0,0
IE 6,4 0,3 -0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
IT 0,4 0,3 0,0 0,2 -0,5 0,6 0,0 0,0
CY 12,9 -0,1 -1,4 1,6
LV -1,2 0,2 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,2 0,0 0,0
LT 
2) 1,8 0,6 0,0 -0,1 -0,1 0,2 0,0 0,0
LU 7,4 -0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0
HU 
2) 6,7 0,2 -0,7 -1,1 -0,4 0,2 0,0 0,0
MT -0,4 0,5 -0,1 0,0 -0,7 0,7 0,0 0,0
NL 3,5 0,5 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0
AT -1,2 0,4 -0,2 -0,4 -0,8 1,0 0,0 0,0
PL -5,9 0,2 -0,2 0,0 -0,4 0,2 0,0 0,0
PT 9,7 0,6 -0,2 -0,2 -1,2 1,3 0,0 0,0
SI 7,3 0,6 -0,4 -0,9 -0,1 -0,2 0,0 0,0
SK 1,8 0,5 0,0 0,1 -0,2 0,2 0,0 0,0
FI 3,1 0,2 0,0 -0,2 -0,4 0,5 0,1 -0,1
SE 0,6 0,3 -0,1 -0,2 0,3 0,3 -0,3
UK 2,0 0,2 -0,1 -0,1 -0,4 0,3 0,0 0,0
EU15 
1) 2,3 0,3 -0,1 -0,1 -0,3 0,4 0,0 0,0
EU10 
1)  0,3 0,4 -0,2 -0,2 -0,3 0,3 0,0 0,0
EU12 
1) 2,6 0,3 -0,1 -0,2 -0,4 0,4 0,0 0,0
EU25 
1)  2,2 0,3 -0,1 -0,1 -0,3 0,4 0,0 0,0
1) excluding countries which have not provided data
2) LT: revised sensitivity analyses; HU: revised High life expectancy scenario
Difference in public pension expenditure increases as percentage points of GDP 
relative to the baseline projection
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4.2.  Higher and lower labour productivity scenarios relative to the 
baseline 
The impact of higher and lower labour productivity growth rates is relatively symmetric and 
steadily cumulates over the projection period while the change in the labour productivity was 
assumed to take place over 2005-2015 and thereafter to remain at the higher/lower level up to 
end of the projection period (Graph 4-1). Across countries, the range of the impact on public 
pension expenditure varies between 0 and 1.6 p.p. of GDP.  
Graph 4-2 shows the variation between countries, focusing on those with the greatest impact. 
When looking at different countries, it was recognised that the assumed change in the labour 
productivity – and wage – growth rate does not affect pension spending as a percentage of 
GDP in countries where pensions are indexed to wages such as DE, LU and SI for earnings-
related pensions and DK and NL for flat-rate pensions. In Ireland too, flat-rate pensions are 
assumed to develop in line with earnings although they are not formally linked to a wage 
index. In Germany, the indexation is basically linked to wages although it is further adapted to 
the changes in the ratio between the numbers of pensioners and employees. In this exercise, 
where only the labour productivity growth rate was changed, only the wage indexation was 
applied in Germany. In the above-mentioned countries, there is no (virtual) change in public 
pension spending according to the higher/lower labour productivity scenarios in comparison 
with the baseline. 
Basically, higher/lower labour productivity assumptions should have the strongest effect on 
pension spending in countries where the indexation of pensions is furthest removed from 
wage indexation. Pensions are indexed to prices only in ES, FR, IT, AT and PL, while in the 
remaining countries they are linked to hybrid indices. Thus, these countries should be the 
furthest from the baseline in Graph 4-2. This is indeed broadly the case for ES and AT, but 
not for all countries with a price indexation. As far as EU15 Member States are concerned, it 
is not clear why the impact should be greater in Portugal than in Spain and Austria. In Italy 
and France, the projected impacts are of the same size (0.4-0.6 p.p.), somewhat lower than in 
Spain and Austria. In the EU10, Cyprus comes out with the greatest impact and then Malta 
and Poland. This is not the expected result as public pensions are partially indexed to wages in 
Cyprus, while in Poland they are fully indexed to prices, and in Malta, they are virtually 
indexed to prices only. In the case of Poland (projected impact only 0.2-0.4 p.p.), it could be 
asked whether the impact should be greater. 
  -43-Graph 4-1  Pension expenditure in the higher (HLP) and lower (LLP) labour 















































































Graph 4-2  Differences in pension expenditure as percentage points of GDP in selected 





















































































































The assumption of the higher/lower labour productivity affects only the levels of pensions and 
wages while other assumptions and driving factors such as the old-age dependency ratio, 
employment rate or pension take-up rate remain unchanged. Thus, the benefit ratio becomes 
the only driving force regarding the change in the pension expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP (Graph 4-3). The interdependence between the wage and pension growth rates, albeit to 
varying degrees in different countries due to different indexation rules, leads to higher 
pensions in the higher productivity scenario and to lower pensions in the lower productivity 
scenario in comparison with the baseline scenario. However, the benefit ratios, which also 
take into account the changes in wages, are affected less than, but in opposite directions to, 
the changes in the average pension level (Graph 4-4). In other words, in the higher 
                                                 
11   GR, ES, LU and UK are excluded from the EU15 in this comparison because (all) data for the sensitivity 
scenarios were not provided. 
  -44-productivity scenario, the benefit ratio decreases despite higher average pensions in 
comparison with the baseline scenario. Conversely, in the lower labour productivity scenario, 
the benefit ratio is higher but average pensions are lower than in the baseline scenario. 
Graph 4-3  Benefit ratios in higher (HLP) and lower (LLP) labour productivity 





















































Graph 4-4  Average pensions in higher (HLP) and lower (LLP) labour productivity 
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4.3.  Higher employment and higher life expectancy scenarios relative to 
the baseline 
Higher life expectancy will increase public pension expenditure in the EU as most public 
pension systems are defined-benefit schemes where the initial pension does not depend on the 
expected time in retirement. On average, both in the EU15 and EU10 in 2050, public pension 
spending is projected to be 0.3 p.p. of GDP higher than in the baseline projection (Graph 4-5). 
When the projections of different countries are looked at, the results are partially in line with 
the hypothesis that the increase in pension spending should be the highest in the countries 
with defined-benefit or flat-rate schemes. The projections of BE, DK, FR, MT, NL, PT, SI 
and SK – all of which have earnings-related defined-benefit or flat-rate public pension 
schemes – show the highest increases (0.5-0.6 p.p. of GDP) in pension spending when a 
higher life expectancy is assumed.  
It is also in line with the hypothesis that the countries with notional defined-contribution 
schemes that include a life expectancy adaptation such as IT, SE, LV and PL project smaller 
increases (0.2-0.3 p.p. of GDP). It can be argued that the increase cannot be reduced to zero 
because there are also pensions such as minimum pensions that are not subject to defined-
contribution rules. Also Finland and Germany project only a 0.2 p.p. increase. In the former, 
the introduction of a life-expectancy coefficient in the pension scheme and, in the latter, the 
practice of adapting pension indices with a sustainability factor can explain the relatively 
small increases. However, it is surprising that a number of countries with defined-benefit 
schemes project equally small or even smaller increases. Estonia, Hungary and Spain project 
only an increase of 0.1 p.p. and the United Kingdom 0.2 p.p.  
These results might be translated into a rule of thumb that an increase in life expectancy by 
one year would increase public pension spending by 0.5 percentage point of GDP in countries 
with defined-benefit or flat-rate schemes (although there are outliers to this rule according to 
the projection results). In countries with defined-contribution schemes that include a life 
expectancy adaption, the impact of increasing life expectancy appears to be about half of that 
in countries with defined-benefit schemes. 
A higher overall employment rate and a higher employment rate of older workers have 
only a marginal impact on public pension spending relative to GDP. In the EU15, both 
scenarios – with about one percentage point increase in total employment – are projected to 
reduce public pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP by only 0.1 p.p. and in the EU10 
by 0.2 p.p. (Graph 4-5). In other words, an employment increase of 10 percentage points 
would reduce public pension spending by 1-2 percentage points of GDP. This finding is also 
in line with the projected employment rate effect on pension spending in the baseline 
scenario.  
The scenario of higher employment rate of older workers has a very similar impact on public 
pension spending. This is an expected result because the impact in overall employment rates 
is of the same magnitude. While, in general, these results can be explained by the high 
interdependence between pension expenditure, on one hand, and higher employment and a 
higher GDP, on the other hand, the differences in the results of different countries need some 
more explanation. 
  -46-In particular, Hungary and Slovenia project essentially higher impacts than other countries. In 
Hungary, the higher overall employment rate would reduce pension spending in 2050 by 0.7 
p.p. and the higher employment rate of older workers by 1.1 p.p. In Slovenia, the respective 
reductions are projected to be 0.4 p.p. and 0.9 p.p. Excluding Hungary and Slovenia, the 
impact of the higher total employment rate would be in the range of 0 to -0.2 percentage 
points, which cumulates during the period when the employment rate increases; thereafter, it 
broadly appears to remain at the lower level that it has reached (Graph 4-10).   
Concerning the scenario of older workers, its impact would also be within a narrow range 
between 0.2 and -0.4 p.p. (excluding HU and SI). However, its impact was projected to 
cumulate over a longer period, up to 2025, although the employment impact was assumed to 
take place by 2015.  
Graph 4-5 Pension expenditure in the higher life expectancy (HLE), higher employment 
rate (HER) and higher employment rate of older workers (OW) scenarios in comparison 
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When looking at the interdependence between the increases in the number of pensioners and 
in pension expenditure in the higher life expectancy scenario in comparison with the baseline 
scenario (Graph 4-6), a clear correlation emerges between these variables for the majority of 
countries. The main driver for the expenditure increase is the number of pensioners. The fact 
that the increase in pension expenditure is somewhat smaller than the increase in the number 
of pensioners was to be expected, given that the average level of the pensions of the oldest 
pensioners tends to be the lowest and the increased life expectancy increases the weight of 
these pensioners.  
                                                 
12   GR, ES, LU, SE and UK are excluded from the EU15 and CY from the EU10 in this comparison because 
data for one or several sensitivity scenarios were not provided. 
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Graph 4-6  Interdependence between the increases of the number of pensioners and 
pension expenditure when the higher life expectancy scenario (HLE) is compared with 
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When comparing the scenarios of higher overall employment rate with the baseline scenario, 
the interdependencies are somewhat less clear-cut. The assumed increases in the employment 
rates, and thus in the number of employed persons, do not result in changes in the number of 
pensioners (the first pictures of  Graph 4-7) in a great number of countries. This may be 
because the change reduces the number of the unemployed rather than pensioners. However, 
in some other countries, this is not the case: both the number of pensioners and pension 
expenditure are projected to decrease. This may point to some inconsistency between the 
modelling of the exits from the labour market in the labour force projections and the 
modelling of the entry into retirement in the national pension models.  
Graph 4-7 Interdependencies between the changes in the number of employed persons, 
pensioners and the pension expenditure when the higher employment rate scenario 
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  -48-When the scenario of higher employment rates of older workers is compared with the baseline 
(Graph 4-8), the interdependencies are stronger: an increase in employment leads to a 
reduction in the number of pensioners, though a relatively smaller reduction and, in some 
countries, no reduction at all or even an increase. However, the impact seems to be stronger 
on pension expenditure than on the number of pensioners. This is surprising given that 
working longer should mean an accumulation of pension rights so that it would not have been 
expected that the change in pension expenditure would be stronger than in the number of 
pensioners.  
Graph 4-8  Interdependencies between the changes in the number of employed persons, 
pensioners and the pension expenditure when the higher employment rate of older 
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The following graphs (Graph 4-9, Graph 4-10) show the differences in pension expenditure 
projections between higher employment rate scenarios and the baseline projection for selected 
countries, covering the whole variation as they display the countries with the greatest and 
smallest differences. Table 4-1 shows the differences at the end of the projection period for all 
countries. 
  -49-Graph 4-9 Differences in pension expenditure as percentage points of GDP in selected 
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Graph 4-10  Differences in pension expenditure as percentage points of GDP in selected 
countries in the higher employment rate (HER) and older workers (OW) scenarios in 
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As far as the driving forces are concerned, in the scenario of higher life expectancy the 
impact on increasing pension expenditure comes principally from a higher old-age 
dependency ratio and a greater number of pensioners, while the take-up ratio remains 
relatively unchanged (in fact, marginally decreases), as does the average pension per 
pensioner. In countries where the pension level adjusts to life expectancy, such as IT, SE and 
FI, the average pension is somewhat lower. In some countries (LT and SI), the average 
pension is projected to slightly increase. 
  -50-In the scenario of a higher total employment rate, the impact on pension expenditure is driven 
by the increased employment rate, while only very few countries project any impact on the 
take-up ratio or the average pension. 
In the scenario of a higher employment rate of older workers, most countries have projected a 
slightly lower pension take-up ratio and a higher average pension. This suggests that Member 
States project that there will be few possibilities to retire on non-actuarial early pensions and 
that a longer working life will result in a higher accrual of pension rights and a later pension 
take-up.   
 
Graph 4-11  Pension take-up ratios in the scenarios of higher life expectancy (HLE), 
higher employment rate (HER) and the higher employment rate of older workers (OW) 
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Graph 4-12  Benefit ratios in the scenarios of higher life expectancy (HLE), higher 
employment rate (HER) and the higher employment rate of older workers (OW) in 
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  -52-ANNEX:   Timing of the decomposed driving factors on public pension expenditure 
increases and the timing and decomposition of the pension take-up ratio by countries 
 
In the graph below, the first picture for each country shows the timing of the effect of the 
driving factors on public pension expenditure. The effect is measured as an average increase 
over a 5-year period. The respective EU15 and EU10 summary graphs were presented in 
section 3.3 (Graph 3-9 and Graph 3-10). 
 
The second picture on the decomposition of the pension take-up ratio is presented only for 
those 15 countries which provided data on the number of pensioners by age group. In the 
graph, "take-up ratio 1" refers to the general take-up ratio of public pensions, i.e. all 
pensioners, including the age group of pension recipients below 55 years, relative to the old-
age population, i.e., persons aged 65+. "Take-up ratio 2" refers to pensioners aged 55+ 
relative to persons aged 65+. The difference between take-up ratios 1 and 2 reflects the impact 
of pension recipients below 55 years, including those receiving survivors' pensions. The take-
up ratio 2 is further decomposed to take-up ratios in respective age groups and the 
decomposition factor of elderly age groups as follows: 
 
  R = number of pensioners 


























ratio up take Pension  
 
In this formula, the first term  + + 65 65 Pop R  (TUR65+ in the graph legend) reflects the take-up 
of public pensions among the population aged 65+, i.e. in the age group above the standard 
retirement age in most countries. The second term  64 55 64 55 − − Pop R  (TUR55-64 in the graph 
legend) reflects the take-up of early pensions in the respective population age group. A 
decrease in the pension take-up in this group would imply a change in the eligibility rules and 
pension behaviour. The third term  + − 65 64 55 Pop Pop  reflects the composition effect of age 
groups and is purely a demographic effect. It is worth noting that the pension take-up ratio in 
the oldest age groups exceeds 100% in many countries. This is acceptable to the degree that it 
reflects the pension take-up among non-resident population while the population figures refer 
to resident populations. Also, in some countries (DE, ES, LV, LT, AT), the starting level is 
above 100% due to the fact that the figure actually measures the number of pensions, not 
pensioners, meaning that different types of pensions, e.g. survivors' and old-age pensions, are 
counted separately. 
 
Concerning the results of individual Member States, it can be noted that the timing and the 
magnitude of different driving factors vary substantially across countries. The dependency 
ratio is the strongest push factor in all countries. It also appears that when the old-age 
dependency ratio increases fastest, the relative offsetting impact of the pension take-up ratio 
increases at the same time. However, in general, this does not seem to mean that the take-up 
of pensions in age-specific or younger age groups decreases, despite the fact that the overall 
take-up ratio does so. The evolution of the overall take-up ratio is strongly influenced by the 
composition effect of age groups, namely by a decreasing age group of persons aged 55-64. In 
fact, in most countries, the evolution of the overall take-up ratio follows quite closely the 
evolution of this demographic component.  
 
  -53-Despite this general trend in country-specific results, a valid question might be how feasible it 
is that there could be a major decrease in the pension take-up ratio in the age group of persons 
aged 65+, as is projected in Austria, Poland and Estonia. In Austria and Poland, the take-up 
ratio is even expected to go clearly below 100%. In Malta, the pension take-up ratio among 
persons aged 65+ is expected to remain around 80%, which appears low in comparison with 
most Member States. Concerning the evolution of the pension take-up ratio among those aged 
55-64 years, the projected decrease is substantially larger in EU10 Member States than in the 
EU15. Although these reductions appear in countries which recently have enacted pension 
reforms and thus the overall trend is plausible, it might be asked whether the projected 
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  -56-Note that in the Luxembourg graph the dependency ratio refers
to the resident population while the employment rate and the 
pension take-up rate include also cross-border workers and 
cross-border pensioners.
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